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ABSTRACT 
 
Antibiotic resistance, according to the World Health 
Organization, is one of the greatest threats to public health. 
To combat the problem, new antibiotics need to be 
developed. However, antibiotic research and development 
is fraught with scientific and economic problems. 
Recognizing these problems and the public health threat 
posed by antibiotic resistance, Congress passed the GAIN 
Act, which President Obama signed into law in June 2012. 
The GAIN Act (Act) incentivizes pharmaceutical companies 
to invest in antibiotic research and development. This 
Article will outline the incentives in the Act and suggest 
why the Act may not solve the growing antibiotic resistance 
problem. There are, however, areas of promise in the Act 
that may mitigate its shortcomings and pave the way to the 
possibility of the Act’s success. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Antibiotic resistance is a worldwide epidemic. It is an acute 
domestic problem, as well. In 2006, methicillin-resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) killed more Americans (19,000) 
than emphysema, HIV/AIDS, Parkinson’s disease, and homicide 
combined.2 Furthermore, “[a]lmost 2 million Americans per year 
2 Infectious Diseases Society of America (IDSA), Statement of the 
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develop hospital-acquired infections (HAIs), resulting in 99,000 
deaths, the vast majority of which are due to antibiotic-resistant 
pathogens.”3  
Antibiotic resistance and the lack of activity along the 
antibiotic development pipeline are problems worthy of Congress’ 
attention. Existing antibiotics are losing their effectiveness due to 
antibiotic resistance and yet, antibiotic development efforts are 
slow to respond to this crisis. Antibiotic development is stunted 
because the pharmaceutical companies spearheading research and 
development are primarily concerned with maximizing profits and 
feel the scientific and economics challenges are not worth the 
investment. Antibiotics are typically not profitable for 
pharmaceutical companies because they are prescribed sparingly to 
stem antibiotic resistance.4 Moreover, consumers only purchase 
small quantities of antibiotics as they are typically used for 7–14 
days, whereas some profitable pharmaceuticals are taken for the 
duration of the consumer’s life.5  
 Congress diverted its attention to the problem and recently 
passed the GAIN (Generating Antibiotic Incentives Now) Act. The 
GAIN Act incentivizes pharmaceutical companies to develop 
antibiotics. However, the GAIN Act’s many incentives for 
antibiotic research and development are unlikely to repair the 
antibiotic pipeline and stem the problem of increasing antibiotic 
resistance.  
Part I of this Article will discuss why Congress felt the need to 
implement the GAIN Act. Part II will discuss the Act’s incentives 
for antibiotic development. Part III will discuss the Act’s potential 
problems and explain why it may not repair the antibiotic pipeline. 
Infectious Diseases Society of America Promoting Anti-Infective Development 
and Antimicrobial Stewardship through the U.S. Food and Drug Administration 
Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA) Reauthorization Before the House 
Committee on Energy and Commerce’s Subcommittee on Health, 
IDSOCIETY.ORG, http://www.idsociety.org/uploadedfiles/idsa/ 
policy_and_advocacy/current_topics_and_issues/advancing_product_research_a
nd_development/bad_bugs_no_drugs/statements/idsa%20pdufa%20gain%20test
imony%20030812%20final.pdf (last visited June 10, 2013). 
3 Id. 
4 IDSA, supra note 2. 
5 Id.  
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Part IV, however, will address potential areas of promise in the Act 
and will suggest how these provisions may mitigate the Act’s 
problems. 
 
I.   THE NEED FOR THE GAIN ACT 
 
Antibiotic resistance occurs when bacteria become resistant to 
antibiotics after being exposed to them.6 This resistance is often 
due to a spontaneous gene mutation during bacterial cell 
replication that allows a cell to continue to divide and replicate, 
unlike its counterparts that were killed off by the antibiotic.7 
Increased antibiotic use correlates to a rise in antibiotic resistance 
because antibiotic use exacerbates natural selection of antibiotic-
resistant bacteria.8 Antibiotic resistance due to overuse is an 
increasing problem in the United States due to (1) the inappropriate 
use of antibiotics, when physicians prescribe antibiotics without 
first determining whether a patient has a bacterial infection that can 
only be cured with antibiotics; (2) the increased presence of 
antibiotics in our food supply, which potentially introduces more 
antibiotic-resistant bacteria into the human population; and (3) the 
extensive use of antibiotics in hospitals.9 Because hospitals 
frequently prescribe antibiotics for patients, hospitals are prime 
breeding grounds for antibiotic-resistant bacteria.  
The social and economic impact of antibiotic resistance is 
enormous and cannot be ignored. “Each year, antibiotic-resistant 
infections are responsible for tens of thousands of deaths, hundreds 
of thousands of hospitalizations and up to $26 billion in extra costs 
to the U.S. health care system.”10 For example, antibiotic resistant 
6 FDA’s Strategy on Antimicrobial Resistance—Questions and Answers, 
U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, http://www.fda.gov/AnimalVeterinary/ 
GuidanceComplianceEnforcement/GuidanceforIndustry/ucm216939.htm (last 
visited Nov. 25, 2012).  
7 General Background: About Antibiotic Resistance, ALLIANCE FOR THE 
PRUDENT USE OF ANTIBIOTICS, http://www.tufts.edu/med/apua/about_issue/ 
about_antibioticres.shtml (last visited July 1, 2013).  
8 Id.  
9 Id.  
10 Pew Health Group, Bill Summary: The Generating Antibiotic Incentives 
Now Act of 2011, http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/ 
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infections (ARIs) increase patient care costs and wage losses 
because ARIs typically lead to hospital stays that are up to two 
weeks longer than they would be if the patients had not contracted 
ARIs.11 Alliance for the Prudent Use of Antibiotics, a 
nongovernmental organization, suggests that a mere 20% reduction 
in antibiotic resistant infections would save up to 5.2 billion U.S. 
healthcare dollars a year.12 Despite the extent of the problem, few 
pharmaceutical companies are willing to devote the time and 
resources to antibiotic development.  
There are several reasons why pharmaceutical companies are 
reluctant to pursue new antibiotics. One reason is that antibiotic 
development poses unique scientific challenges. For example, over 
a 10-year period, it took 72 candidate antibiotics to yield one FDA-
approved product, whereas other pharmaceuticals required only 15 
candidates to yield an FDA-approved product.13 Drug development 
is facing increasing economic challenges—it currently costs $400–
$800 million per approved agent.14 Further, there are fewer 
perceived economic incentives for pharmaceutical companies to 
develop antibiotics than other drugs. Antibiotics do not generate as 
much revenue as other pharmaceuticals because they (1) are only 
used for short time periods, typically 7–14 days; (2) are priced low 
to keep the public health free of communicable diseases; and (3) 
are sparingly prescribed to curb the problem of antibiotic 
resistance.15 Further still, because there are some generic 
antibiotics that are still effective against many bacterial infections, 
physicians often relegate newly developed antibiotics to a second 
Fact_Sheets/Antibiotics_and_Innovation/Antibiotics_GAIN_FactSheet.pdf (last 
visited July 1, 2013). 
11 The Cost of Antibiotic Resistance to U.S. Families and the Health Care 
System for Consumers, Patients, Policy-Makers, ALLIANCE FOR THE PRUDENT 
USE OF ANTIBIOTICS, http://www.tufts.edu/med/apua/consumers/ 
personal_home_5_1451036133.pdf (last visited July 1, 2013). 
12 Id.  
13 IDSA, supra note 2. 
14 B. Spellberg et al., The Epidemic of Antibiotic-Resistant Infections: A 
Call to Action for the Medical Community from the Infectious Diseases Society 
of America, 46 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES, 155–64 (2008). 
15 Id. 
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or later line of defense against these pathogens.16 
Due to these disincentives, the antibiotic pipeline is running 
dry. “In the 1980s, the . . . FDA approved 29 new systemic 
antibiotics. That number dropped to . . . nine in the 2000s.”17 This 
comes as no surprise considering that, “compared to the revenues 
generated from sales of ‘blockbuster’ high blood pressure or 
cholesterol medications that patients take for many years or even a 
lifetime, the returns from antibiotics are low.”18 It is for this reason 
that legislative attention has become necessary to combat the tide 
of antibiotic resistance. 
 
II.   THE GAIN ACT’S INCENTIVES 
 
The GAIN Act provides pharmaceutical companies many 
incentives to develop new antibiotics to combat the growing 
problem of antibiotic resistance. While there are many provisions 
in the Act, this Article focuses only on those that will serve as the 
most powerful incentives for antibiotic development and that are 
most likely to be effective in combatting antibiotic resistance. 
 
A.  The Act Adds Exclusivity Periods to Qualified Antibiotics 
 
Exclusivity is a special protection under FDA rules, 
independent of patent protection. Exclusivity provides the holder 
of new approved drugs protection from competition in the 
marketplace by limiting FDA approval of similar drugs during the 
exclusivity period.  
Because getting an antibiotic drug market-ready is especially 
time-consuming and costly, patent protection does not provide 
sufficient incentive to pharmaceutical companies. Pharmaceutical 
16 Chantal Morel & Elias Mossialos, Stoking the Antibiotic Pipeline, 340 
BRIT. MED. J. 1115, 1115 (2010). 
17 Allan Coukell & Sharon Ladin, Testimony before the House Committee 
on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Health, http://www.pewtrusts.org/ 
uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Speeches/Testimony%20of%20Allan%20Cou
kell%20and%20Sharon%20Ladin%20re%20GAIN.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 
2012). 
18 Pew Health Group, supra note 10. 
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companies typically obtain patents at the beginning of the drug 
discovery process. However, “taking a novel compound through 
pre-clinical testing into clinical studies and all the way to approval 
takes a significant period of time—and . . . patents have a limited 
lifespan.”19 By the time a candidate antibiotic is approved by the 
FDA and put on the market, the 20-year term of a patent is likely 
to be nearing its end.20 Pharmaceutical companies thus need 
additional FDA exclusivity to protect their inventions on the 
market after both the lengthy clinical testing and the FDA approval 
processes. 
One of the Act’s key provisions adds five years of exclusivity 
to qualified new antibiotics at the time of their entry into the 
market.21 This five year exclusivity is in addition to the applicable 
Hatch-Waxman five-year new chemical entity (NCE) exclusivity, 
Hatch-Waxman three-year new clinical studies exclusivity, seven-
year orphan drug exclusivity, or six-month pediatric exclusivity.22  
The Act similarly adds an additional six months of exclusivity 
for approved antibiotics that have been paired with a companion 
diagnostic test.23 Companion diagnostic tests are tests that identify 
both individuals who will most likely benefit from the antibiotic 
and individuals who will most likely have a serious adverse 
reaction to the antibiotic.24 Drugs paired with companion tests are 
eligible for extended exclusivity because they further the goals of 
the GAIN Act. Specifically, if physicians use companion 
diagnostic tests to determine the likelihood of success in the patient 
before prescribing a certain antibiotic, such antibiotic will be used 
less and will reduce the speed of antibiotic resistance.  
 
19 Robert G. Hibbert et al., FOOD, BEVERAGE, AND DRUG LAW CLIENT 
STRATEGIES 109 (Eddie Fournier, 2008).  
20  Id. 
21 Id. 
22  Id.  
23  Id. Bill Summary: The Generating Antibiotic Incentives Now Act of 2011 
(H.R. 2182), supra note 10. 
24  Id.; Celia Henry Arnaud, Diagnostics-Drugs Pairings Advance 
Personalized Medicine, CHEMICAL AND ENGINEERING NEWS, (July 23, 
2012), http://cen.acs.org/articles/90/i30/Diagnostics-Drugs-Pairings-Advance-
Personalized.html. 
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B.  The Act Provides for Priority Review and Fast-Track  
Approval of Qualified Antibiotics 
 
Under the GAIN Act, antibiotic applications will be eligible for 
both priority review and fast-track approval through the FDA new 
drug application process.25 The FDA’s priority review and fast 
track processes are complex, but new drugs that are able to get 
priority and fast track “labels” will get to market significantly 
faster.26 The faster the antibiotics get to market, the sooner the 
pharmaceutical companies can reap the benefits of costly research 
and development. Because pharmaceutical companies can in turn 
invest time and money into new antibiotic research and 
development after their previously developed antibiotic is on the 
market and bringing in revenue, it is likely that a faster antibiotic 
FDA approval process will ultimately bring more antibiotics into 
the market more quickly. In 2003, antibiotics under priority review 
and fast-track approval had a median approval time of six months, 
whereas the median review and approval time was 13.8 months.27 
Together with added exclusivity periods, faster approval time 
makes the protection term effectively longer and allows products 
to enter the market sooner. 
 
C.  The Act Creates a Study on Incentives for Qualified  
Infectious Disease Biological Products 
 
Another provision in the Act "direct[s] the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) to conduct a study to determine the 
need for incentives to encourage research, development, and 
marketing for qualified infectious disease biological products."28 
25  Pew Health Group, supra note 10. 
26 Fast Track, Breakthrough Therapy, Accelerated Approval and Priority 
Review: Expediting Availability of New Drugs for Patients with Serious 
Conditions, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, 
http://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ByAudience/ForPatientAdvocates/Speeding
AccesstoImportantNewTherapies/ucm128291.htm (last visited July 1, 2013).  
27  Id. 
28 H.R. REP. NO, 112-495 (2012), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/cpquery/?&sid=cp1121EYgl&r_n=hr495.112&dbname=cp112&&sel=TOC
_102426&. 
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Biological products (biologics) include vaccines, blood and blood 
components, allergenics, somatic cells, gene therapy agents, 
tissues, and recombinant therapeutic proteins.29 Congress’ focus on 
these qualified biologics could prove instrumental in addressing 
the problem of antibiotic resistance and infectious disease control. 
Indeed, the near disappearance of mortality from diseases such as 
typhoid fever, cholera, typhus, smallpox, polio, and the Bubonic 
plague can be attributed to biologics and the development of 
immunizations.30  
The Act does not yet delineate specific incentives for qualified 
infectious disease biologics, but rather commits the GAO to 
devoting the time and focus necessary to find compelling research 
and development incentives. The requirements of this provision are 
vauge in light of the specific problems posed by biologics research 
and development. While "[d]rugs generally have well-defined 
chemical structures, and a finished drug can usually be analyzed to 
determine all its various components" it can be nearly impossible 
to characterize a biologic.31 As such, biologics “manufacturers 
must ensure product consistency, quality, and purity by ensuring 
that the manufacturing process remains substantially the same over 
time."32 Drug manufacturers do not face this same quality 
assurance problem.  
 
III. THE GAIN ACT’S PROBLEMS 
 
The GAIN Act, despite its many antibiotic development 
incentives, is not likely to keep antibiotic resistance at bay. The 
Act is problematic because (1) there are no provisions encouraging 
appropriate use and marketing of new antibiotics to prevent 
antibiotic resistance to these new antibiotics, (2) the additional five 
29 Vaccines, Blood, and Biologics: Consumers (Biologics), U.S. FOOD AND 
DRUG ADMINISTRATION http://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/ 
ResourcesforYou/Consumers/default.htm (last visited July 1, 2013).  
30 Peter Barton Hutt et al., Food and Drug Law Cases and Materials 876 
(Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 3d ed. 2007). 
31 How do Drugs and Biologics Differ?, BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY 
ORGANIZATION (Nov. 10, 2010), http://www.bio.org/articles/how-do-drugs-and-
biologics-differ (last visited Aug. 9, 2013). 
32 Id. 
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years of exclusivity at the end of new antibiotic’s patent terms will 
increase healthcare costs and thus, limit the beneficiaries of the 
new antibiotics to only those who can afford them, (3) the financial 
incentives will likely still not be enough to encourage 
pharmaceutical companies to invest the necessary time and money 
into cumbersome and low-yielding antibiotic research and 
development, and (4) the FDA drug approval process is still too 
complicated and unpredictable for pharmaceutical companies to 
expend drug development costs at the risk of facing eventual non-
approval by the FDA. 
 
A.   The Act is Void of Meaningful Antibiotic  
Conservation Incentives 
 
The Act, while incentivizing antibiotic development, does not 
incentivize appropriate antibiotic use.33 The use of new antibiotics 
without appropriate conservation techniques will allow infectious 
diseases to be exposed to, adapt to, and ultimately resist these new 
antibiotics. The Act’s proposed remedy—new antibiotic 
development—could therefore exacerbate the very problem it was 
enacted to address. 
Incentives are one of the only tools possible under current law 
to ensure appropriate antibiotic conservation. This is because the 
FDA currently lacks authority to restrict a physician's prescription 
of antibiotics. Alternatively, antibiotics could be classified in a 
scheme similar to the DEA's scheduled drug classifications. The 
restrictions placed on antibiotic prescriptions could mirror 
antibiotic stewardship recommendations. In such a situation there 
would be real authority to restrict antibiotic prescriptions. 
However, since the scheduling classifications for controlled 
substances are based on the potential for dependency, it may be 
impractical to create an analogous program for antibiotics.  
Hospitals and other healthcare providers will likely need more 
incentives to implement antibiotic conservation measures. Indeed, 
hospitals can reduce antibiotic use by undertaking infection control 
33 Ed Silverman, The Op-Ed: No Gain From Antibiotic Incentives, 
PHARMALOT (June 21, 2012, 7:50 AM), http://www.pharmalot.com/2012/06/ 
the-op-ed-no-gain-from-antibiotic-incentives (last visited Aug. 9, 2013). 
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measures, such as screening patients for infectious pathogens and 
isolating infected patients. These procedures, however, take 
hospital manpower, time and resources, and are not reimbursed by 
insurance. Insurance reimbursement indeed is a powerful tool that 
is currently "not well deployed to promote continued antibiotic 
effectiveness."34 Insurance reimbursement "hinders conservation 
[of antibiotics] and allows hospitals and physicians to receive 
additional payments for out-of-control infections and unnecessary 
prescriptions."35 To meaningfully reduce health care providers’ 
antibiotic use, the magnitude of financial incentives must at least 
match that of the reimbursements they currently receive for 
antibiotic prescriptions.  
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid services have enacted 
such a financial incentive. Under pay-for-performance programs, 
Medicare does not reimburse hospitals for treatment required due 
to hospital-acquired infections. As such, the hospital is financially 
responsible for the services it provides to these infected patients.36 
At the state level, California led the way in creating meaningful 
incentives for healthcare providers to appropriately prescribe 
antibiotics. In January 2008, California Senate Bill 739 became 
effective, requiring general acute care hospitals “to monitor and 
evaluate the utilization of antibiotics and charge a quality 
improvement committee with the responsibility for oversight of the 
judicious use of these medications."37  
The Infectious Diseases Society of America (IDSA) proposed 
many changes during the congressional hearings on the GAIN Act, 
34 Kevin Outterson, The Legal Ecology of Resistance: The Role of Antibiotic 
Resistance in Pharmaceutical Innovation, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 613, 616 
(2010). 
35 Id. 
36 Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Medicare & 
Medicaid Services, Hospital-Acquired Conditions (HAC) in Acute Inpatient 
Prospective Payment System (IPPS) Hospitals, http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/ 
Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/HospitalAcqCond/Downloads/ 
HACFactsheet.pdf (last visited June 12, 2013). 
37 The California Antimicrobial Stewardship Program Initiative, 
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH, http://www.cdph.ca.gov/ 
programs/hai/Pages/AntimicrobialStewardshipProgramInitiative.aspx (last 
visited June 10, 2013). 
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but Congress failed to incorporate the proposals into the enacted 
bill. Among the proposed changes was a stewardship proposal 
whereby the GAIN incentives would be limited only to those 
pharmaceutical companies that were careful with how new 
antibiotics were used.38 Noting the inherent problem with 
providing market protections for new antibiotics, commentators 
Robert Weissman and Anthony So of the Huffington Post noted 
that “[r]esistance to an antibiotic increases as the drug is used more 
frequently, so the use of new antibiotics must be reserved for 
resistant infections … monopoly protections [however] conflict 
with the need for preservation by encouraging companies to sell as 
much of the new drug as possible.”39 
 
B.   The Act Will Likely Increase Healthcare Costs 
 
The GAIN Act will also likely increase healthcare costs. Since 
the Act will add five years of exclusivity on top of the 20-year 
patent terms for qualified antibiotics, the introduction of generic 
antibiotics will be delayed five years, costing the United States 
health care system several billion dollars in prescription drug 
expenses.40 However, many Americans are already unable to 
purchase needed antibiotics due to prohibitive expense. These 
individuals will have to wait out the GAIN Act–approved 
antibiotics’ patent and FDA exclusivity phases before an 
affordable generic equivalent to come on the market. 
 
38 Kevin Outterson, All Pain, No GAIN: Need for Prudent Antimicrobial 
Use Provisions to Complement the GAIN Act, Alliance for the Prudent Use of 
Antibiotics, ALLIANCE FOR THE PRUDENT USE OF ANTIBIOTICS, 
http://www.tufts.edu/med/apua/news/news-newsletter-vol-30-no-1-4.shtml (last 
visited June 14, 2013). 
39 Robert Weissman and Anthony So, Generating Antibiotic Incentives 
Now: GAIN—Or Just Greed (June 6, 2012, 5:36 PM), HUFFINGTON POST, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-weissman/antibiotic-resistance-
_b_1572284.html (last visited Aug. 9, 2013). 
40 Silverman, supra note 33. 
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C.   The Act's Incentives Are Likely Not Enough to Incentivize 
Pharmaceutical Companies to Undertake Costly and Risky 
Research and Development 
 
Moreover, the Act’s many incentives will likely not be enough 
to encourage pharmaceutical companies to invest in antibiotic 
research and development. Because antibiotic research and 
development is notoriously risky and unpredictable, some 
pharmaceutical companies may be incentivized to act only when 
they are sure they will be able to recoup all of their expenses in the 
marketplace. While the five-year exclusivity period will help 
pharmaceutical companies recoup more of their research and 
development expenses, it likely will not result in the recovery of 
all of these expenses. The Act, then, will likely not compel these 
companies to undertake antibiotic research and development.  
The Act also does not include a potentially powerful 
incentive—tax credits. The IDSA, in its report before Congress, 
proposed that tax credits would incentivize pharmaceutical 
companies to undertake antibiotic research and development.41 Tax 
credits relieve a company of some percentage of the tax burden on 
its revenues and therefore are attractive to large firms that already 
have products on the market.42 Tax credits can similarly be 
attractive to smaller companies, as tax credits can be transferred or 
even redeemed as a cash refund for a company with a low tax 
bill.43 
 
 
 
41 Brad Spellberg et al., The Epidemic of Antibiotic-Resistant Infections: A 
Call to Action for the Medical Community from the Infectious Diseases Society 
of America, 46 Clinical Infectious Diseases 155, 160 (2008). 
42 Priya Sharma & Adrian Towse, New Drugs to Tackle Antimicrobial 
Resistance: Analysis of E.U. Policy Options, United Kingdom Office of Health 
Economics (2011). 
43 ELIAS MOSSIALOS ET AL., POLICIES AND INCENTIVES FOR PROMOTING 
INNOVATION IN ANTIBIOTIC RESEARCH (European Observatory on Health 
Systems & Policies 2010). 
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D.   The Complicated and Oft-Maligned FDA Drug Approval 
Process Remains Largely Unchanged 
 
The FDA drug approval process is known among 
pharmaceutical companies to be unpredictable and complicated, 
especially when compared to other countries' processes. While 
welcoming the GAIN Act's provisions, drug developers and the 
IDSA think "more needs to be done to improve the regulatory 
landscape and the economics of antibiotic drug development."44 In 
a letter to HHS Secretary responding to Congress' passing of the 
Act, the IDSA president stated that "regulatory disincentives 
resulting from the lack of clear and feasible antibacterial clinical 
guidance for industry has become a towering impediment to 
antibiotic development."45 Biopharmaceutical executives have 
similarly suggested that the United States look to Europe as a 
successful example of how to implement “a more robust strategy 
for funding antibiotic R&D to address public health priorities."46 
In its testimony before Congress, the IDSA recommended that 
the GAIN Act include a new FDA approval mechanism—Special 
Population Limited Medical Use (SPLMU) Drugs. Under the 
SPLMU mechanism, a “drug’s safety and effectiveness would be 
studied in substantially smaller, more rapid, and less expensive 
clinical trials than traditionally required.”47 As such, a drug would 
be approved for use only in a small subset “of patients for whom 
the benefits of the drug have been shown to outweigh the risks.”48 
The smaller clinical trials under the SPLMU mechanism would 
make it easier for companies to get FDA approval for new 
antibiotics given that the FDA currently requires two large clinical 
trials that cost between $50-100 million and take many years to 
complete. 49 Further, the SPLMU designation is not dispositive 
44 Steve Usdin, GAIN Act, FDA stance only first steps to refilling antibiotic 
pipeline in U.S., BIOCENTURY (Nov. 19, 2012), http://www.biocentury.com/ 
biotech-pharma-news/coverstory/2012-11-19/gain-act-fda-stance-only-first-
steps-to-refilling-antibiotic-pipeline-in-us-a1. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 IDSA, supra note 2. 
48  Id. 
49 Id. 
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because the drug sponsor can later go “through a traditional study 
route for an indication for the anti-infective the limited use 
designation could be removed.”50 As SPLMU drugs would be used 
only in those patients with a highly resistant pathogen, antibiotic 
resistance to these novel drugs would be slowed.51 
 
IV. AREAS OF PROMISE IN THE GAIN ACT 
 
A.  The Act's Antibacterial Drug Development Task Force  
May Address Some of the IDSA's Proposals Not  
Expressly Adopted in the Act 
 
The Act’s creation of the “Antibacterial Drug Development 
Task Force” may address some of the problems under the current 
provisions. The task force is comprised of “scientists and clinicians 
from throughout CDER [the Center for Drug Evaluation and 
Research]” who “will work with other experts from academia, 
regulated industry, professional societies, patient advocacy groups, 
and government agencies.” The task force’s many goals include (1) 
exploring “novel scientific approaches to facilitate [antibiotic] 
development;”52 (2) “identify[ing] issues related to unmet medical 
needs for antibacterial drugs, reasons for the lack of a robust 
pipeline for antibacterial drug development, and new approaches 
for weighing the risks, benefits, and uncertainties of potential new 
drugs;”53 and (3) “participat[ing] in think tanks . . . to address 
various issues that could enable [antibiotic] development, 
including study design, statistical analytical methods, and approval 
pathways.”54 However, it is currently unclear how much power the 
task force will have to suggest further legislative action or to 
advise the FDA.  
The task force should pick up some of the IDSA proposals that 
50  Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Antibacterial Drug Development Task Force, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG 
ADMINISTRATION, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/ 
DevelopmentResources/ucm317207.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2012). 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
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were not incorporated into the actual text of the Act to address 
some of the problems addressed in this Article. One proposal made 
to congressional staff could address the potential problem of new 
antibiotic development and use leading to bacterial antibiotic 
resistance of those new antibiotics. This proposal called “for the 
CDC to spend $10 million per year in surveillance, to track the 
resistance profiles of the new drugs approved under GAIN.”55 Such 
a surveillance program could ensure that infectious diseases do not 
rapidly become resistant to new antibiotics due to overuse or poor 
inherent antibiotic properties. While the task force will likely not 
contribute to the economic incentives of the Act, it could ensure 
appropriate antibiotic use. The more appropriate the antibiotic use, 
the less dire the situation in the antibiotic pipeline will become 
because antibiotic resistance to the newly developed antibiotics 
will be minimized. 
 
B.  The Act's Recognition of Biologics as Another Solution to the 
Antibiotic Resistance Problem is Promising 
 
The Act’s recognition that biologics, such as vaccines, may 
also combat infectious diseases demonstrates that Congress took a 
comprehensive approach in shaping the Act. Had the Act solely 
focused on chemical pharmaceutical development, the pipeline 
would be missing one of its greatest potential solutions—the 
development of biologics to complement the use of chemical 
antibiotics to which infectious diseases can easily build resistance.  
Despite these areas of promise, however, the Act does not go 
far enough to make up for its shortcomings in other areas. 
Congress should consider amendments if they desire to fully 
address the twin problems of antibiotic resistance and the dry 
antibiotic development pipeline.  
 
 
 
 
55 Kevin Outterson, supra note 36.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
“Although we think of [antibiotics] narrowly in connection 
with treating acute infections, their use underpins much of modern 
care—from routine surgical procedures to organ transplants and 
cancer treatment.”56 If the GAIN Act is unable to solve the twin 
problems of antibiotic resistance and a dried-up antibiotic 
development pipeline, the modern healthcare we take for granted 
may cease to exist in the near future. While the GAIN Act contains 
numerous provisions that incentivize pharmaceutical companies to 
develop antibiotics, the incentives will likely not be enough to 
encourage companies to invest in antibiotic development over 
more profitable drugs. In focusing primarily on antibiotic 
development, the Act fails to adequately address the responsible 
use of antibiotics. Regardless of whether the Act incentivizes 
antibiotic development, it will be for naught if no stewardship 
protocols are implemented to stem antibiotic resistance to newly 
developed antibiotics.  
 As antibiotic development and approval is a notoriously 
lengthy process, it will be years before the Act’s policies really 
take effect. With this in mind, the Health and Human Services 
Department recently agreed to pay GlaxoSmithKline $40 million 
to develop antibiotics. The agreement further provided an option 
whereby the federal government will give GlaxoSmithKline as 
much as $200 million over the next five years.57 
Assuming, arguendo, that the incentives are effective, new 
antibiotic development alone will not solve the problem of 
antibiotic resistance. There ought to be a continued focus on the 
appropriate use of these antibiotics along with the exploration of 
alternative infectious disease combatants—namely biological 
derivatives—to ensure we do not experience the catastrophic 
effects that could result from complete antibiotic resistance.  
 
  
56  Pew Health Group, supra note 10. 
57 Barry Meier, Pressure Grows to Create Drugs for ‘Superbugs’, CNBC 
(June 3, 2013, 1:45 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100783270. 
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PRACTICE POINTERS 
 
 Hospitals and other healthcare providers should consider 
antibiotic stewardship protocols to ensure that infectious 
diseases do not quickly become resistant to the newly 
developed antibiotics incentivized by the Act. 
 Should further legislative action be taken to amend the Act, 
Congress should examine other countries’ antibiotic 
research and development programs that have been lauded 
by pharmaceutical and biologics companies as superior to 
the United States. 
 Congress should consider restricting physicians' antibiotic 
prescribing authority by implementing a DEA-regulated 
scheme analogous to scheduled drug classifications and 
corresponding restrictions on prescriptions. 
 The fact that antibiotic resistance itself could be a powerful 
incentive for pharmaceutical companies to enter the market 
should not be overlooked. Antibiotic resistance may 
actually stimulate rather than retard innovation, as 
resistance makes existing antibiotics obsolete, paving the 
way for new drug entry. 
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